FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA :THE CRUCIAL DYNAMICS

FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA: THE CRUCIAL DYNAMICS

The goal of this study is the evaluation of the important factors that have an impact on the nature of federalism in Nigeria. Federal fiscal policy, the creation of states, ethnicity, religion, the local government system, the military, the economy and federal character principle are seen as these vital factors. Together, these factors operate to manifest the crucial dynamics of the federal system in Nigeria. The impact of these factors on federalism in Nigeria will be examined in terms of the past, present, and possible future manifestations.

As with all federal systems, the Nigerian federal system is a dynamic system which changes with time. The profile of the relative powers of the national and the state (before 1967, regional) governments, and the nature of the stability of the polity are the key areas in which the Nigerian federal system varies with time. Oshuntokun[ 1] has provided an elaborate analysis of the historical foundations of Nigerian federalism.

The First Republic era (1960-66) that emerged from this historical foundation had a weak federal government and strong regional governments.[ 2] The brief Ironsi administration (January to July 1966) officially replaced federalism with a unitary system. The Ironsi administration ended before the unitary system could be implemented. The successive Gowon administration (1966-75) restored the federal system and created a 12-state federal structure (in place of the four-region structure).[ 3] The Gowon era also witnessed severe stresses and strains in the political system, and the instability culminated in an intertwined secession attempt and the Civil War (1967-70). The end of the war meant an abandonment of the secession and the non-balkanization of Nigeria.

The Muhammed/Obasanjo (1975-79) administration created seven more states and instituted a 19-state federal structure. The state governments tended to gain power at the expense of the federal government during the Second Republic (1979-83).[ 4] However, compared to the First Republic, the Second Republic had a more dominant federal government.

The Buhari administration (1984-85) and Babangida administrations (1985 to present) re-emphasized the dominance of the federal government.[ 5] The Babangida administration created two more states--instituting a federal system with 21 states and Abuja, Federal Capital Territory (FCT).

On the whole, the first era of military governments (1966-79) and the second era of military governments (1984 to present) mostly have meant that the state governments have lost significant amounts of power to the centre, which waxes stronger.[ 6] The top-down command tradition and hierarchical structure of the military mainly accounted for these changes. The limited political backgrounds and the technocratic bent of the military leaders also led to more visibility and power for career civil servants. Adamolekun and Ayo[ 7] see the inadequate number of political institutions during military governments as also accounting for this ascendancy of career civil servants. There are now plans and efforts to return the country to full democratic rule in 1992. The experiences of the past indicate that, although the federal government will still remain dominant, the state and local governments will gain more power after 1992. Change is an enduring feature of the Nigerian federalism.

These changes do not necessarily mean that the Nigerian polity was, is, or will be, more or less a federal system. As Jinadu[ 8] notes, federalism theorists hold the view that all forms on the spectrum of federal systems are still federal systems (their being in the left, middle or right of the federalism spectrum not making them any more or less federal). Thus, it does not mean that all federal systems have to have the same amount and manner of all the features of federalism (which theorists like Wheare[ 9] analysed as basic ingredients of federalism).

How well the Nigerian polity grows after 1992 (the Third Republic) will significantly be influenced by the installation of political structures needed to serve as safety valves (which reduce stresses and strains to manageable levels) in the political system. (Arinze[ 10] noted some political institutions that served these purposes during the Second Republic.)

Since gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria has continuously functioned as a federal system (except the Ironsi administration's attempt to institute a unitary system, which was reversed by the succeeding Gowon administration before it was implemented). The factors that have made various Nigerian governments, both military and civilian, maintain federalism, continue to have impacts on the Nigerian polity. Their impacts will continue in the foreseeable future. As noted above, these factors are ethnicity, religion, the economy, the local government systems, the military, the federal character principle, federal fiscal policy, and the issue of states creation. Starting with the factor of federal fiscal polity, the impacts of these factors on the Nigerian federal system will be examined.
Federalism and fiscal policy

The conceptualization and operation of the federal fiscal policy much relate to the nature and functioning of the Nigerian federal system--specifically, the relative federal, state and local government roles in the generation of public revenues and the determination of public expenditures have fluctuated with changes in the relative strength of the federal government and the regional units. During the First Republic the regional governments were able to generate a significant amount of their public revenues and also to have more control over their public expenditures. The relatively weaker federal government and the stronger regions, during the First Republic, accounted for this significant role of the regions in terms of fiscal policy.

Starting with the Gowon administration, the federal government has continuously played a stronger role in terms of generation of revenue and determination of expenditures. Data culled from various sources by public finance specialists like Olaloku, [ 11] for example, show that the federal government exerted more power than the sub-national units, in terms of revenue policy, during the Gowon administration, in comparison with the First Republic. Adamolekun and Ayo[ 12] have also noted that the '... Federal Government has continued to control the key sources of revenue', and that it '... now plays an effective leadership role in sharp contrast to the situation prior to 1966'. The tremendous increase and dominance of petroleum revenues, starting with the Gowon administration, significantly accounted for this increase in federal revenue power. The federal government control of the petroleum revenue[ 13] led to this increase in federal revenue power.

It can also be postulated that the smaller size of states, compared to the First Republic regions, also accounted for this federal revenue power. The four-region federal structure of the First Republic consisted of subnational units (the regions) that were physically large, economically more viable and politically more potent. The regions were thus more able to gain strength at the expense of the federal government. The present 21-state federal structure (which was increased from prior 19-state and 12-state federal structures) has subnational units (states) which are smaller, more economically dependent on other parts of the country. and politically less potent. These states are thus less able to gain strength at the expense of the federal government.

Absence of 'constitutional limitations on the spending power of the Federal Government' has also been seen as allowing,

. . . the Federal Government to use its wider and more elastic power to tax and to borrow, as support for its spending power in order to influence the performance of functions constitutionally allocated to the state governments. [ 14]

Thus, this constitutional factor contributes to the increasing fiscal power of the federal government.

Central to the dynamics of the Nigerian federal fiscal policy is the issue of revenue allocation (in terms of the formula that is applicable for the sharing of revenue among the federal, state and local governments.) The contentious nature of the revenue allocation formula issue is underscored by the fact that between 1946 and 1980, eight commissions and committees had been used to examine it.[ 15] The recent reviews are the Dina (1968), Aboyade (1977), and Okigbo (1979) reviews; and the current Revenue Allocation System (RAS) which came into effect in 1982.[ 16]

The principles that are used to decide on the revenue allocation are the derivation, need, and national interest (or even development) principles.[ 17] Adamolekun and Ayo[ 18] have posited that, in the final analysis, the revenue allocation formulae can be seen as often being influenced by technical and political factors (and they recommend both factors being given maximum attention.) They also recommend the revenue allocation system being used to make the local government systems to be more viable in a three-tier system of federal, state and local governments.[ 19] The political dispensation envisaged for the Third Republic (which is supposed to commence from 1992) has significantly provided for a possible viability of the local government systems. Adamolekun and Ayo[ 20] have also noted that the goal of ensuring that revenue allocation, to each level of government, relates to the constitutionally assigned functions of these levels of government, has not been adequately catered for. Possibly, this incongruity works to the advantage of the federal government, and may present conditions which encourage it to infringe on functions assigned to state and local governments.

At present, there is tremendous effort to reduce the percentage of revenue derived from petroleum by increasing the role of the manufacturing sector of the economy (and the export of manufactured goods). Although the goal of this policy is the reduction of Nigeria's dependence on petroleum revenue, the success of this policy may impact on the federal government's power over revenue policy. At present, the federal government controls petroleum revenue (which is the dominant revenue source). If future dispensation means the federal government giving significant amounts of the revenue (generated by the export of manufactured goods and other non-petroleum products) to the states and local governments, the latter may gain from a future revenue allocation system.

The above analysis of the federal fiscal system has shown that fiscal arrangement has played a significant role in affecting the nature of power sharing between the federal, state and local governments. Thus, the federal fiscal policy strongly determines the essential dynamics of the Nigerian federal system. It has also been noted that the '... heavy dependence of subnational governments on federal financial power has facilitated the emergence of national policy orientations', and that the national government is now clearly dominant quite unlike the First Republic era.[ 21] This means that the federal fiscal policy (if adequately and judiciously utilized) can be used to foster national unity, while still guaranteeing adequate subnational groups autonomy. Thus, the nature of power distribution among the federal, state and local governments, the nature of Nigerian federalism, and the stability of the Nigerian federal system are significantly related to the nature of the Nigerian federal fiscal policy.
Ethnicity and religion

Federal fiscal policy is just one of the factors that affect the Nigerian federal system. Ethnicity and religion are other crucial elements in the Nigerian federal system. Nigeria consists of numerous ethnic groups, with Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo being the more numerous ethnic groups. Other significant ethnic groups are Ibibio, Tiv, Kanuri, Edo, Ijaw, Nupe, and Idoma.[ 22] Islam, Christianity and traditional African religions are the major forms of religion that are prevalent in Nigeria.

Thus, in essence, Nigeria is a country that is very culturally diverse with multiple and complex ethnic and religious groups. Nigeria came into existence as a result of British colonialism.[ 23] The British colonial policies sometimes fostered integration and at other times fostered societal cleavages. Even before contact with Europeans, many of the traditional state systems that later made up Nigeria had sustained links. For example, the Benin Empire had sustained intense political, economic and cultural links with the Yoruba state systems and the Ibo state systems. As noted by Madiebo,[ 24] during and after British colonialism, the integration of the ethnic groups in Nigeria increased. However, links among the various Nigerian ethnic groups did not at any time, in either ancient or modern Nigerian history, lead to a homogeneous polity. Each of the various groups had strong traditional state systems that anchored a diverse rich cultural heritage that could not easily disappear. Even the less centralized state systems like the Ibo political system, as shown by Nzimiro,[ 25] had a well developed traditional political system and cultural heritage.

In essence, modern Nigeria is a culturally diverse polity. A federal system was adopted as the best possible system that could maintain unity among the various groups, while still guaranteeing many of them adequate group autonomy. According to a common maxim, federalism in Nigeria aims at ensuring 'Unity in Diversity'.

Ethnicity is a potent factor in Nigerian federalism. Foundations of interest group dynamics in Nigeria are based on ethnicity.[ 26] Political parties are often ethnically based and voting behaviour are also influenced by ethnic factors.[ 27] Ethnicity also had a lot to do with the Civil War.

Ethnicity has thus often generated centrifugal forces in the Nigerian political system. This sort of social cleavage is not unique to the Nigerian federal system. Other federal and non-federal systems do also suffer from this sort of social cleavage.[ 28] The success of federal systems depends on the creation and efficient operation of structures that manage these social cleavages in such a way that, although these conflicts and cleavages may not be eliminated, they do not drag, wobble or immobilize the political system. The success of the federal system thus depends on managing the system in such a way that centripetal forces surpass, or at least equalize, the centrifugal forces. For example, Nwosu, a political scientist, notes that nation-building in the Nigerian federal system should involve a '... process of transference of loyalty from primordial to the national domain'.[ 29] He also saw the two-party system (crafted to discourage a provincial profile of political parties), that is designed for the proposed Third Republic, as a step in the direction of placing loyalty more at the national level. However, some, like Akinola,[ 30] think that a two-party system in Nigeria will be less representative, and that it can actually exacerbate ethnic and religious cleavages. Constitutional provisions that ensure policies and public personnel recruitment reflecting the federal character of the country, and the endorsement of policies that increase inter-ethnic integration, are some other mechanisms that are sometimes used to foster unity in the polity.[ 31]

Jinadu observes that the ethnic factor '... per se need not generate conflict'.[ 32] He also adds that conflict emerges once ethnicity '... is situated in a particular type of social or plural diversity'.[ 33] Nigeria is a culturally diverse polity and thus conflicts arise. Use of the above mentioned integrative tools can help ensure that the centripetal forces surpass, or at least equate to, the centrifugal forces. The same tools can also be used to manage conflicts between Muslims and Christians. The religious controversy that surrounded the issue of Nigeria's relations with the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), in the late 1980s, shows the need for prudent actions in connection with policies that impact on religion. The volatile nature of these ethnic and religious cleavages necessitates these factors being effectively, and continually, managed in order to secure stability in Nigeria's federal polity.
States' creation

Creation of new states is one of the tools that is sometimes used to reduce ethnic conflicts. By creating states that allow groups, which feel marginalized, to have some measure of local autonomy, tensions are sometimes reduced before they constitute a drag or a brake on the adequate functioning of the political system.

As shown above, Nigeria has witnessed the creation of many states. At independence in 1960, Nigeria had a three-region federal structure. During the First Republic, the Mid-Western Region, now re-named Bendel State, was created and this action gave Nigeria a four-region federal structure. The Gowon administration gave Nigeria the 12-state federal structure. The creation of seven more states transformed Nigeria into a 19-state federal system during the Muhammed/Obasanjo administration. The latest states' creation exercise involved the creation of two more states by the Babangida administration. Thus. at present, Nigeria is a federal system with 21 states and Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).

It may be pertinent to note that three of the above four states' creation exercises were carried out by military governments. The Mid-Western Region creation was the only states' creation exercise that occurred during a civilian era--in this case, the First Republic. The demands and agitations for new states usually unleash enormous political dynamics that overstress the Nigerian political system. Military governments, by nature, do not tolerate unstructured and massive inputs into the political system. Military governments thus often effectively prune and reduce the amount of states' creation demand inputs to levels that are manageable (which thus allow the states' creation decision-making process to function without undue stress). The military governments often view the enormous agitations associated with demands for new states as signs of societal indiscipline. The reduction of the demand inputs is thus seen by the military as a patriotic act of curbing destabilizing tendencies in society.

These sort of elitist and authoritarian reactions cannot be resorted to by democratic governments. The civilian governments thus allow the massive states' creation demand inputs to have a full impact on the political process. However, this often results in demand inputs overload which paralyses the political processes that relate to states' creation decision making. Thus, civilian governments often fail to be able to take decisions on states' creation issues, due to this severe stress on the political process.

In this sense, it can be said that civilian governments are often willing, but unable, to create new states. On the other hand, military governments, unfettered by democratic structures and processes (but, instead, imbued with military fondness for dispatch and societal order), often block unstructured and massive states' creation demand inputs, which they consider unnecessary. With smaller amounts of inputs which the political process can easily ingest and transform into policy, the military moves efficiently and promptly teaches decisions on states' creation issues.

The Mid-Western Region was created during the First Republic (a civilian government) due to a rare convergence of the interests of the political leaderships in some of the regions. The Mid-Western Region was carved out of the then Western Region.

Despite the creation of the Mid-Western Region, the First Republic still faced a huge problem in terms of acute structural imbalance in the federal system. The Northern Region constituted 79 per cent of the area of Nigeria and 54 per cent of the country's population.[ 34] This reality violated a cardinal federal principle. This principle states that one or two regional units in a federal system should not have enough power to neutralize politically other regional units or to establish dominance over the national government.[ 35] During the First Republic, the Northern Region had the size and the population that enabled it to neutralize the other regions and to dominate the federal government. This situation constituted a great source of political instability during the First Republic. Many Nigerian political leaders were adequately conscious of the gravity of this problem.[ 36]

In 1967, the Gowon administration turned the four-region federal structure into a 12-state federal structure. This decision eliminated the serious problem posed by the size and population of the then Northern Region. The 12 states came into existence on the eve of the Civil War. The period was laden with political gloom and heightened political instability. The creation of the 12-state federal structure was perceived as an action contributing to political dynamics that enhance centripetal forces in the Nigerian polity. The 19-states and 21-states frameworks (created by the Muhammed/Obasanjo administration and Babangida administration, respectively) were also seen as action that will further enhance centripetal forces in the polity.

Adejuyigbe[ 37] sees the demand for the creation of new states as often based on the need to bring the government closer to the people, the desire to foster more national unity and the yearning '... to minimize conflict between states and within states'. However, the immediate reason that the issue of the creation of new states often gets on national policy agenda is a forceful, open and organized demand, by minority groups within some states. Such ethnic groups often base their demands on the premise that they are being politically, economically and culturally marginalized by the dominant ethnic groups in their existing states.

Nigerian history has shown that as soon as new states have been created new ethnic groups emerge to consider themselves as victims of ethnic oppression in these new states. Ironically, often the alleged culprits of these ethnic oppressions are ethnic groups that were once discriminated against before new states, that enabled them to be the dominant ethnic groups, were created. Thus, creation of new states seems to increase, rather than decrease, the demand for new states. This reality poses the serious problem of the creation of new states appearing to be a never-ending exercise.

Without doubt, creation of new states has helped to bring stability to the Nigerian federal system. New states enable ethnic groups that formerly felt marginalized to gain effective voice in both states and national affairs. The new states thus help to reduce the number of ethnic groups that foster centrifugal forces in the polity.

Another criterion that may help to determine the need for states' creation is the feasibility of a new state being socioeconomically viable. This does not mean that new states should be economically autonomous. They need only be economically viable, rather than being economically independent. In reality, the current 21-states federal system creates more economically interdependent states. Such economic interdependence tends to foster more unity and thus helps to sustain the federal system.

Adequate democratization and socioeconomic development that improves the quality of life of all (especially the urban and rural poor), will help bring to an end continuing demands for new states. When a society enjoys a democratic polity, and a sizeable number of people have adequate shelter, food and clothing, a heightened perception of societal marginalization (by some groups) tends to be curbed. The population of such a society tends to be less excitable about political changes (like states' creation). Thus, a politically and socioeconomically contented Nigerian population is that which will not constantly clamour for new states.
The federal character principle

Like the states' creation exercises, the federal character principle is also used to enhance stability in the Nigerian federal polity.

In a country with complex and diverse ethnic, religious and geographical backgrounds, it is easy for some groups, rightly or wrongly, to perceive themselves as being marginalized. In Nigeria, the goal of the federal character principle is the minimalization of misunderstandings and conflicts that emerge from this sort of perception. The use of this principle involves the staffing of public personnel positions (both political and career service positions) in such a way that the personnel profile of the public service reflects the federal character of Nigeria. Osaghae[ 38] believes that this principle is viewed mainly in terms of the reflection of the various states that make up Nigeria. He would prefer the federal character principle to reflect the diverse and complex ethnic, regional, religious, as well as statist, backgrounds.

Merit and representativeness are the two main factors that guide the recruitment into the public service of countries (both unitary and federal polities). Unitary systems emphasize merit while federal systems combine merit and representativeness factors.[ 39] The federal character principle, applicable in Nigeria, embodies these factors of merit and representativeness. Although the principle is also a provision in the 1979 Constitution, there have not been clear guidelines on its implementation. Adamolekun and Ayo[ 40] hold to the view that the merit factor should mostly guide employment in technical, scientific and other specialist positions. This sort of view may be informed by the fact that the merit factor is important in these high-skill positions. Following this logic, both the representativeness and merit factors can be seen as being more relevant for administrative positions.

It is important to note that the implementation of the federal character principle do sometimes evoke controversy. Some individuals and groups feel that the sole use of merit would be preferable and fair, while other individuals and groups think that it would be inappropriate.

The magnitude and intensity of the federal character principle implementation vary with different eras. For example, the Second Republic was perceived as studiously observing the principle, while the Buhari administration did not pay much attention to it.[ 41]

For the foreseeable future, the twin factors of merit and representativeness will continue to prevail in Nigeria and other countries. The diverse and complex cultural profile of Nigeria will continue to make it necessary and desirable to have the federal character principle.
The local government system

Nigeria became an independent country in 1960 with the various regions of the federation having dissimilar local government systems. As Nigeria is mostly a rural society, the local government systems (as the governing apparati nearest to the public) have significant impacts on the general public. During the First Republic, local government systems in all the regions were viable. Their impacts on the mass public were therefore prominent. The dissimilar nature of the local governmental systems in the various regions meant that dissimilar political cultures and dissimilar political structures and processes mutually reinforced each other. Nigeria, therefore, had a federal political landscape that was nourishing dissimilar political cultures and dissimilar political structures and processes. To the extent that this meant more momentum for centrifugal forces, and less momentum for centripetal forces, the local government systems were ill-serving the Nigerian federal polity.

This situation continued, to a greater or lesser extent, during most of the first era of military governments (with the 12-states federal structure). An interesting development was that, while local government systems continued to function, as they did in the First Republic, in the northern and southwestern states, in the southeastern states, the state governments emasculated the local government systems by substituting direct state-level administrations for local governments.[ 42]

On the whole, during the first era of military governments, there was significant concern about the inadequacies in the Nigerian local government systems. This concern led to the desire to seek more understanding about the profile and the problems of the local government systems and possibly to institute reforms. Series of conferences often organized by the universities, which focused on the local government systems, began in the late 1960s.[ 43]

Various state governments also attempted local government reforms. For example, the former East-Central State, from which emerged the present Anambra and Imo States, commissioned the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, to study and advise the state government on its ambitious local government reform efforts. The fact that pre-colonial Nigeria had various sound, traditional political systems has often led many to believe that a governmental design that combines the best features of the traditional and modern governments can result in a very effective governing system at the local and other levels of government. Studies that have expanded knowledge about the various traditional political systems in Nigeria will aid such an undertaking. A study done by Nzimiro[ 44] on a specific region of the country, is an example of such in-depth study of traditional political systems in Nigeria.

Apart from the above mentioned local government reform efforts, attempted by some state governments, the federal government was also much interested in this issue. Therefore, the federal government of Nigeria unveiled a comprehensive nationwide local government reform in 1976.[ 45] It provided for a local government system that could function as a viable third level of governance and as a fairly uniform system of local government for the entire country. This reform has the potential to correct the problems associated with the prevalence of various dissimilar local governmental systems in the country.

A uniform local government system results in uniform local government structures and processes. This will, in turn, lessen (rather than enhance) the fostering of dissimilar political cultures across the country. In this sense, the 1976 local government reform laid the foundation for a more stable federal system. The fact that the reform significantly lessens the formal role of traditional political authorities means that the reform aims at enhancing professional and modernized public management systems at the local level. However, this action has not significantly changed the influential roles that traditional political authorities play (mainly informally) in local, state and national politics.

It is also important to note that it was during the first era of military governments that the federal government became involved in local government administration and management. During the First Republic, '... local government administration and management were the exclusive responsibility of the regional/state governments'.[ 46] The 1976 reform was one of the glaring examples of the new role of the federal government in governance of local government. These developments meant new realities in terms of intergovernmental relations.

The 1979 Constitution, building on the foundations of the 1976 local government reform, provided for a more viable local government system.[ 47] The Babangida administration, in preparing the country for the Third Republic, has instituted more changes that will make local governments even more viable. Specifically, provisions of more revenue resources, and the reduction of undue states' control of local governments through the abolition of the States Ministries of Local Governments, are two of these changes.

The Muhammed/Obasanjo administration (which crafted and implemented the 1976 local government reform) and the Babangida administration eras seem to be the periods that have witnessed more sustained local government changes. The fact that both had the additional governing task of preparing the country for the return of civilian governments (the Second Republic and the Third Republic for the Muhammed/Obasanjo and Babangida administrations, respectively) might have accounted for their desire to reform the government that is closest to the broad masses. Additionally, the fact that the two administrations were military governments might have made it easier for them to achieve their goals. The ability of military governments to curb excessive public inputs, which local government reform exercises often engender, might have enabled these governments to deal with manageable inputs in their decision-making process. (However, this sort of curbing of public inputs is clearly undemocratic.)

On the whole, these reforms, through the introduction of uniform local government systems and the bringing of governmental apparati closer to the people, foster centripetal forces in the federal system, and, thus, provide for a more stable federal system.
Role of the military

Since independence in 1960, the military has been in charge of Nigerian governance more than the civilians. Nigeria has been under civilian governments from 1960 to 1966 and from 1979 to 1983; the remainder of the time, the country has been under military rule. (1992 is slated for another return to civilian governance.) Thus, as Elaigwu analysed,[ 48] the study of federalism in Nigeria cannot be divorced from the role of the military.

The military has been the organization that always intervenes when the Nigerian political system appears to be wobbling. Whether such interventions are unavoidable or necessary has always been a subject of much debate. The ability of the military to serve as a corrective government, or even govern better than the civilians, has also been a controversial issue. However, the reality is that the military has, over the years, become intertwined with the Nigerian governing process, and therefore, the federal system. This reality even led Nnamdi Azikiwe, a former President, to propound the theory of 'dyarchy'.[ 49] Dyarchy is seen by Azikiwe and others, as a joint civilian and military governing system. To the advocates of dyarchy, stability, socioeconomic progress and democratization in Nigeria can only occur within such a framework. The dyarchists seem to base their design on the premise that the military can never be permanently removed from the Nigerian governing arena. However, there have been other intellectuals who think that the arguments of the dyarchists cannot be sustained, either '... in terms of logic or by empirical data'.[ 50]

Specifically, relating Nigerian federalism to the long periods of military rule produces some highlights. The military seems to account for the hastening of the growth of the dominance of the national government over the state governments.[ 51] The '... unitary hierarchical structure of the military organization' is seen by Adamolekun and Ayo[ 52] as contributing to the dominance of the centre during the eras of military rule. It is also important to note that the brief Ironsi Administration, January-July 1966, even attempted to change the federal system into a unitary system. However, the administration was brought to an end before the unitary system could be implemented. The succeeding Gowon administration restored the federal system.

Elaigwu[ 53] has posited that the centralizing tendencies in the federal system, during the Gowon administration era, were facilitated by 'the nature of military legislation by decrees', the economic boom generated by increase in petroleum revenues, 'the creation of small states' and the Civil War (which allowed the federal government 'to take certain measures that were not easily reversible'). The centralization, during the Gowon administration era is seen as being so thorough that no 'state was in a position to secede any longer'.[ 54]

The Muhammed/Obasanjo administration further accelerated the centralizing process. The increasing control over television broadcasting in the states and the banning of the use of state coat-of-arms are examples of the centralizing tendencies during that era.[ 55] The centralizing tendencies during the Buhari and Babangida administrations are perceived by Elaigwu[ 56] as having been, and being, respectively, at the level of Muhammed/Obasanjo administration era.

Another highlight is that the '... legacy of centripetal traits under military rule' was manifested in the 1979 Constitution and thus transmitted to the Second Republic.[ 57] In the same manner, the centripetal dynamics during the Babangida administration will influence the planned Third Republic.

On the whole, the military administrations' performance, in terms of economic progress and political stability, is not seen as adequate.[ 58] However, compared to civilian governments, Elaigwu[ 59] sees the military as being better '... in terms of political, social and economic development'.

Despite some changes in the governing structures and processes, Nigerian federalism is seen as being maintained through all the eras of military rule.[ 60] Additionally, to Elaigwu,[ 61] military rule is not necessarily incompatible with federalism. In the Nigerian context, Elaigwu[ 62] argues,

. . . that even military regimes that have mobilizational styles and hierarchical structures of command have not been able to ignore the centrifugal forces in Nigeria's sociopolitical setting and the necessity of affecting a compromise between the forces of centrifugalism and centripetalism in a multinational polity. The reasons for this military sensitivity to potent issues of subnational identity and autonomy are to be found in the nature of Nigerian society.

The military rulers also recognize the above dynamics in the Nigerian polity. For example, Yakubu Gowon, a former head of state, is quoted[ 63] as observing that one

. . . could not get the best out of people under a unitary system of government. You probably could, but at the expense of one group or the other or by being dictatorial and by forcing certain issues. I did appreciate that you could not do that in Nigeria and get away with it.
The economy

The nature of the economy is another factor relating to the federal system in Nigeria. The links are in three main areas: strains and stresses in the polity, the nature of economic interdependence among the states and the relative powers of the national and state governments.

Economic growth and prosperity that are well spread throughout the various strata of the population and the various parts of the country, usually mean less strains and stresses in the polity. For example, the economic boom which petroleum revenues engendered during the Gowon era accounted for relative stability during that period. On the other hand, the economic downturn in the 1980s resulted in significant strains and stresses in the polity. The late 1980s in particular meant the need for great political finesse in governing and managing a country that has to endure severe economic adjustment programmes.[ 64]

The nature of economic interdependence among the states also affects the federal system. During the First Republic, the regions were very big and relatively economically self-sufficient. The regional and ethnic conflicts and relative regional economic autonomy mutually reinforced each other during the First Republic. This reality accounted for the secessionist threats by many of the regions and finally contributed to the Civil War. Beginning with the 12-states structure created in 1967, and continuing under the current 21-state structures, is the relative lack of economic self-sufficiency in the various states. The relative small size of the states, compared to the regions of the First Republic era, significantly account for the states lacking economic autonomy. This situation has bred increasing economic interdependence among the various states. This accelerating economic interdependence among the states, in turn, means the lessening of secessionist tendencies.

The nature of the economy also affects the federal system in terms of the relative powers of national and state governments. Beginning in the 1970s increasing petroleum revenue has placed a lot of financial resources in the hands of a national government that has a lot of financial powers. This has meant the national government increasingly gaining power at the expense of the state governments.[ 65] With a lot of financial resources, the federal government of Nigeria, in the 1970s in particular, took over many functions performed by the state governments.

On the whole, as shown above, economic realities constitute an improved set of dynamics which has significant impacts on the Nigerian federal system.
Conclusion

The analysis of the above crucial factors relating to federalism in Nigeria shows that the federal system in Nigeria constitutes a dynamic milieu. Each of these factors and the governing apparati seem to be constantly changing.

Federal fiscal policy, states' creation, ethnicity, religion, the local government systems, the military, the federal character principle and the economy, as shown above, have continually manifested themselves in varying intensity and magnitude. Thus their impacts on the nature of the Nigerian federal system vary with time in terms of magnitude and intensity. The changing governing apparatus and sociopolitical dynamics account for the varying intensity and magnitude of these factors.

The federal fiscal policy has been constantly reviewed by various government-commissioned study groups. This often leads to constant change in the federal revenue allocation formula. These changes are often necessitated by changes in revenue sources and amounts, changes in public expenditure needs, and sociopolitical dynamics. More importantly, the changes in federal fiscal policy often lead to changes in relative power among national, state and local governments. This often means significant changes in intergovernmental relations and the entire federal system. These changes have been shown continually to increase centralization in the federal system. Recent fiscal policy changes also tend to encourage the development of the local government system as a viable third level of governance.

Ethnicity and religion have been shown as prominent factors having an impact on Nigeria's federal system. Ethnic and religious cleavages even largely accounted for Nigeria having a federal system. The functioning goal of many federal systems has mostly been the creation of governing systems that have political structures which constantly manage cleavages that are prevalent in multi-ethnic and/or multi-religious societies. However, some, like Nweke,[ 66] view the federal system '... as much as an answer to the socio-cultural pluralism of Nigeria as it is a major source of conflicts on domestic issues and foreign policy'. Although Nweke's view is valid, federalism can be seen as the best practical political system for very pluralistic societies. The task of forcing distinct cultural groups to lose their identity in order to attain homogeneity (that suits a unitary system) often requires severe undemocratic rule and also often proves to be a dismal failure.

Highly pluralistic societies that have federal systems have been able to manage their societal cleavages very well. Though not curing all social ills, federal systems in pluralistic societies perform better than unitary systems in pluralistic societies. A common maxim in Nigeria, 'Unity in Diversity', captures this imperfect but desirable reality. As shown above, Nigerian states' creation exercises have been used to assuage groups that feel significantly disadvantaged. Within such states such groups are able to enjoy relative cultural and political autonomy. Additionally, the federal character principle has also helped to avoid severe marginalization of some groups. The federal character principle is seen as a consociational model.[ 67] Jinadu[ 68] also notes the consociational tendencies in the Nigerian federal polity (although he thinks that some improvements are necessary).

The long eras of military rule have also been shown as contributing to centralization tendencies in the Nigerian federal system. Adamolekun and Ayo[ 69] hold the view that, even without the military, centralization will still occur in the federal system. They view the military as only hastening the centralization tendencies. All federal systems seem to be having these centralization tendencies. Relatively strong centres seem to help stabilize federal polities. Morrison[ 70] has noted the same tendencies in the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The economy also affects the federal system through the increase in financial resources at the national level, often enabling that level to take over functions that belong to state and local levels. More importantly, increasing economic interdependence among the states, as shown above, enhances the stability of the polity by lessening secessionist tendencies. The local government system, through reforms, is now more viable and uniform. Uniform local government systems foster more homogeneous political culture. This reality in turn enhances the centripetal tendencies in the federal system and thus increases political stability.

All the above factors have been shown to have some centripetal dynamics. If well harnessed, these dynamics will aid the functioning and stability of the Nigerian federal system. Programmes, like the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), which seek to instil national orientations in university and other higher education institution graduates show that appropriate policies and programmes invigorate the federal system. On the whole, the creative balance of centrifugal and centripetal forces, manifested by the above crucial dynamics in the Nigerian federal polity, accounts for federalism being alive and well in Nigeria.
Notes and references

1 Jide Oshuntokun, 'The historical background of Nigerian federalism', in A. B. Akinyemi, P. D. Cole and Walter Ofonagoro (eds), Readings on Federalism (Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1980), pp 91-108.

2 Ladipo Adamolekun and S. Bamidele Ayo, 'The evolution of the Nigerian federal administrative system', Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol 19, No 1, Winter 1989, pp 158-160.

3 Ibid, pp 160-161; Isawa J. Elaigwu, 'Nigerian federalism under civilian and military regimes', Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol 18, No 1, Winter 1988, p 177.

4 Adamolekun and Ayo, op cit, Ref 2, p 165.

5 Ibid, pp 166-167.

6 Ibid, pp 160-167.

7 Ibid, p 164.

8 L. Adele Jinadu, 'A note on the theory of federalism', in A. B. Akinyemi, P. D. Cole and Walter Ofonagoro (eds), Readings on Federalism (Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1980), p 19.

9 K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (Oxford University Press, New York, 1964).

10. Benjamin Chinweze A. Arinze, Nation-Building in Nigeria: The New Federalism (The University of Oklahoma Doctoral Dissertation, Norman, OK, 1985).

11 Akin F. Olaloku, 'Nigerian federal finances: issues and choices', in A. B. Akinyemi, P. D. Cole and Walter Ofonagoro (eds), Readings on Federalism (Nigerian institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1980). pp 122-123.

12 Adamolekun and Ayo, op cit, Ref 2, pp 169-170.

13 Ibid. pp 169-170.

14 Rafiu Akindele, 'Federal grants-in-aid to state governments: a note on an aspect of the federal spending power in Nigeria', in A. B. Akinyemi, P. D. Cole and Walter Ofonagoro (eds), Readings on Federalism (Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1980), p 188.

15 Adamolekun and Ayo, op cit, Ref 2, p 170.

16 Ibid.

17 Olaloku, op cit, Ref 11, p 123.

18 Adamolekun and Ayo, op cit. Ref 2, p 170.

19 Ibid, pp 168-170.

20 Ibid, p 170.

21 Ibid.

22 L. Adele Jinadu, 'Federalism, the consociational state and ethnic conflict in Nigeria', Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol 15, No 2, Spring 1985, p 74.

23 T.N. Tamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase, 1898-1914 (Longman, London, 1972); Alexander A. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War (Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu, 1980).

24 Ibid.

25 Ikenna Nzimiro, Studies in Ibo Political Systems: Chieftaincy and Politics in Four Niger States (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1972).

26 Austin M. Ahanotu, 'The role of ethnic unions in the development of Southern Nigeria: 1916-66', in Boniface I. Obichere (ed), Studies in Southern Nigerian History (Frank Cass, London, 1982), pp 155-174.

27 Toyin Falola and Julius Ihonvbere, The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic: 1979-84 (Zed Books, London, 1985), p 74; Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N J, 1963).

28 African Concord, 12 June 1989, p 50; Donald V. Smiley, 'Cleavages and the Canadian federal system', in A. B. Akinyemi, P. D. Cole and Walter Ofonagoro (eds), Readings on Federalism (Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1980), pp 322-335.

29 African Concord, op cit, Ref 28.

30 Anthony A. Akinola, 'A critique of Nigeria's proposed two-party system', The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 27, No 1, March 1989, pp 109-123.

31 Otwin Marenin, 'The Nigerian state as process and manager: a conceptualization', Comparative Politics, Vol 20, No 2, January 1988, pp 224-225.

32 Jinadu, op cit, Ref 22, p 73.

33 Ibid.

34 Elaigwu, op cit, Ref 3, p 176.

35 Omolade Adejuyigbe, 'Rationale and effect of state creation in Nigeria with reference to the 19 states', in A. B. Akinyemi, P. D. Cole and Walter Ofonagoro (eds), Readings on Federalism (Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1980), pp 192-193; Elaigwu, op cit, Ref 3, pp 175-176; Wheare, op cit, Ref 9, p 50.

36 Adejuyigbe, op cit, Ref 35, pp 192-193.

37 Ibid, p 191.

38 Eghosa E. Osaghae, 'The complexity of Nigeria's federal character and the inadequacies of the federal character principle', The Journal of Ethnic Studies, Vol 16, No 3, Fall 1988, pp 1-25.

39 Adamolekun and Ayo, op cit, Ref 2, p 171.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 John M. Ostheimer, Nigerian Politics (Harper and Row, New York, 1973), pp 72-73.

43 Ibid, p 73.

44 Nzimiro, op cit, Ref 25.

45 Adamolekun and Ayo, op cit, Ref 2, pp 172-174.

46 Ibid, p 172.

47 Ibid, pp 172-174.

48 Elaigwu, op cit, Ref 3, pp 173-188.

49 'Bayo J. Adekson, Nigeria in Search of a Stable Civil-Military System (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1981), p 18.

50 Ibid, p 16.

51 Adamolekun and Ayo, op cit, Ref 2, pp 164- 174; Elaigwu, op cit, Ref 3, pp 183 and 187.

52 Adamolekun and Ayo, op cit, Ref 2, p 160.

53 Elaigwu, op cit, Ref 3, p 187.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid, p 178.

58 Ibid, p 187; Victor A. Olorunsola, Soldiers and Power: The Development Performance of the Nigerian Military Regime (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA, 1977).

59 Elaigwu, op cit, Ref 3, p 188.

60 Ibid, passim.

61 Ibid, pp 174 and 182-188.

62 Ibid, p 174.

63 Ibid, p 183.

64 Jon Kraus, 'Economic adjustment and regime creation in Nigeria', Current History, Vol 88, No 538, May 1989, pp 237 and 249-250.

65 Adamolekun and Ayo, op cit, Ref 2, p 162.

66 G. Aforka Nweke, 'The domestic structure and processes of Nigeria's foreign policy', in G. O. Olusanya and R. A. Akindele (eds), Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty-Five Years (University Press, Ibadan, 1986), p 45.

67 Osanghae, op cit, Ref 38, p 1.

68 Jinadu, op cit, Ref 22.

69 Adamolekun and Ayo, op cit, Ref 2, p 174.

70 Fred L. Morrison, 'Cooperative federalism in the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany', in A. B. Akinyemi, P. D. Cole and Walter Ofonagoro (eds), Readings on Federalism (Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1980), p 258.